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ABSTRACT
Article 2 of the ECHR regulates the right to life as a fundamental right that the
deprivation of it shall be done in a certain threshold of necessity. In particular when the taken
of life is done by the agents of states. This article examines the interpretation of article 2 by the
European Court of Human Rights, especially when it is read in conjunction with state’s positive
obligations under article 1. The discussion will proceed in three sections: first, the review of the
evolvement of the procedural requirements of article 2 in cases of deaths arising from the acts
of state agents. Second, is the examination of whether the procedural requirements of article 2
can be used as a mean in securing the adequate protection of the right to life from arbitrary
killing by the use of lethal force? Third, is an analysis of an effective legal system as a
procedural requirement of article 2 in the case of homicide caused by the negligence of the
authorities? Finally, this essay will conclude by examining the Court’s position in its endeavors
to achieve an appropriate balance between not over-burdening its Member States and securing
the adequate protection of the right to life.
This research submitted that when article 2 it is read together with positive obligation
of states under article 1, duty to investigate emerges as a consequence. Development shows that
the Court has a distinct approach in setting a minimum standard for the states to adhere to.
Keyword: right to life, human rights, European, constitution
I. INTRODUCTION
The right to life is one of the most
fundamental provisions of the European
Convention on Human Rights (hereinafter
1 McCann and Others v. the United Kingdom, no.
18984/91, § 53, 27 September 1995; Cakici v.
Turkey, no. 23657/94, § 86, 8 July 1999; McKerr v.
the United Kingdom, no. 28883/95, § 108, 4 May
2001; Hugh Jordan v. the United Kingdom, no.
24746/94, § 102, 4 May 2001; Kelly and Others v.
the United Kingdom, no. 30054/96, § 91, 4 May
2001; Shanaghan v. the United Kingdom, no.
37715/97, § 85, 4 May 2001; Isayeva v. Russia, no.
57950/00, § 172, 24 February 2005; Isayeva, and
“ECHR”).1 No deprivation of life can be
conducted intentionally, except in certain
conditions as stated in article 2 paragraph
2, which gives a privilege for states to take
one’s life if it is “absolutely necessary”,
Others v. Russia, nos. 57947/00, 57948/00 and
57949/00, § 168, 24 February 2005; Leonidis v.
Greece, no. 43326/05, § 53, 8 January 2009. See
also DJ Harris and others, Law of the European
Convention on Human Rights (3rd edn, OUP 2014)
203; and FD Sanctis, ‘What Duties do States have
with Regard To the Rules of Engagement and the
Training of Security Forces under Article 2 of the
European Convention on Human Rights?’ (2006)
10 1 The International Journal of Human Rights 31.
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such as in defense of others, effecting
lawful detention, and in overcoming riot or
insurrection.2 Moreover, article 15
paragraph 2 also justifies the deprivation of
life by states in the time of war.3 It means
that the right to life is not absolute in its
nature.4 However, in order to secure the
enjoyment of the right to life, there should
be a procedure to examine the legitimating
of the taking of life by use of lethal force.
The European Court of Human
Rights (hereinafter “the Court”), in its
verdicts, indicates an importance of duty to
investigate, as a procedural obligation of
the right to life, when it is taken by the use
of force.5 This principle was generated
after the Court interpreted the protection of
the right to life under article 2 in
conjunction with the state’s obligation in
securing the Convention’s rights within its
jurisdiction under article 1. The term
“jurisdiction” enables the Court to expand
2 European Convention on Human Rights, Article 2.
3 ibid Article 15 paragraph 2.
4 FN Aolain, ‘The Evolving Jurisprudence of the
European Convention Concerning the Right to Life’
(2001) 19/1 Netherlands Quarterly of Human
Rights 21, 22-3.
5 See McCann and Others v. the United Kingdom (n
1) § 161; Kaya v. Turkey, no. 22729/93, § 86, 19
February 1998; Ergi v. Turkey, no. 23818/94, § 82,
28 July 1998; Çakici v. Turkey (n 1); Tanrikulu v.
Turkey, no. 23763/94, § 101, 8 July 1999; McKerr
v. the United Kingdom (n 1) § 111; Hugh Jordan v.
the United Kingdom (n 1) § 105; Kelly and Others
v. the United Kingdom (n 1) § 94; Shanaghan v. the
United Kingdom (n 1) § 88; Anguelova v. Bulgaria,
no. 38361/97, § 136, 13 June 2001; Ulku Ekinci v.
Turkey, no. 27602/95, § 144, 16 July 2002; Hackett
v. the United Kingdom, no. 34698/04, admissibility
decision of 10 May 2005; Nachova and Others v.
the application of this procedural
obligation to extraterritorial actions of state
agents.6
Essentially, an obligation to
investigate deaths resulting from the
actions of state agents is vital in
maintaining public trust of a democratic
society, because ordinarily the state is the
only entity that monopolises the use of
lethal force.7 In this context, an effective
official investigation can be used as a
means of ensuring the legitimate aims of
the authorities in taking a life.
Subsequently, there will be a degree of
certainty that the authorities will not abuse
their power.
Moreover, leaving the families of the
deceased uninformed regarding the
circumstances of the deaths may also
torture them mentally. Therefore, recalling
the importance of transparency and
adequate information for the families of the
Bulgaria, nos. 43577/98 and 43579/98, § 110, 6
July 2005; Ramsahai v. the Netherlands, no.
52391/99, § 321, 15 May 2007; Al-Skeni v. the
United Kingdom, no. 55721/07, § 163, 7 July 2011.
6 ibid § 149. See also C Ryngaert, ‘Claritying the
Extraterritorial Application of the European
Convention on Human Rights’ (2012) 28/74
Merkourios 57, 59; A Cowan, ‘A New Watershed?
Re-evaluating Bankovic in Light of Al-Skeni’
(2012) (1)1 Cambridge Journal of International and
Comparative Law 213, 219.
7 See McKerr v. the United Kingdom (n 1) § 114;
Hugh Jordan v. the United Kingdom (n 1) § 114;
Kelly and Others v. the United Kingdom (n 1) § 117;
Shanaghan v. the United Kingdom (n 1) § 91; May
2001; Anguelova v. Bulgaria (n 5); Ramsahai v. the
Netherlands (n 5) §§ 321, 324; Al-Skeni v. the
United Kingdom (n 5) § 167.
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deceased, the Court extends the procedural
obligation of the right to life to any case of
deaths caused by state agents, even on non-
lethal force incidences. In some recent
jurisprudence, the Court requires an
effective official investigation for the case
of sudden death resulting from medical or
surgical intervention8 and in the case of
unexpected homicide caused by
authorities’ negligence, such as
abandoning citizens living in a life-
threatening environmental condition.9
Despite its robust judgments,
protecting the right to life is not an easy
task for the Court. On one hand the Court
has to set a minimum standard on the
protection of the right to life. On the other
hand the Court could not impose upon
states an impossible or disproportionate
burden.10 It should be borne in mind that
the 47 member states11 of the Convention
will have different capacities and
capabilities in managing their societies.
Therefore, this essay aims to analyse
whether the Court has achieved an
appropriate balance between not over-
8 See Erikson v. Italy, no. 37900/97, admissibility
decision of 26 October 1999. See also D Korff, ‘The
Right to Life: A Guide to the Implementation of
Article 2 of the European Convention on Human
Rights’ (2006) 8 Human rights handbooks 75; J
Chevalier-Watts, ‘Effective Investigations under
Article 2 of the European Convention on Human
Rights: Securing the Right to Life or an Onerous
Burden on a State?’ (2010) 21 3 The European
Journal of International Law 701, 707; and T
McGleenan, Investigating Deaths in Hospital in
burdening its Member States and securing
the adequate protection of the right to life
in cases of deaths resulting from the actions
of state agents.
The analysis will be based on the
review of the judgments of the Court,
relating to the interpretation of the right to
life, under article 2 of the ECHR when it is
read together with article 1. The discussion
will proceed in three sections: first, the
review of the evolvement of the procedural
requirements of article 2 in cases of deaths
arising from the actions of state agents.
Second, is the examination of whether the
Court has reached a balance between not
over-burdening its Member States and
securing the adequate protection of the
right to life from arbitrary killing by the use
of lethal force. Third, is an analysis of an
effective legal system as a procedural
requirement of article 2 in the case of
homicide caused by the negligence of the
authorities. Finally, this essay will
conclude by examining the Court’s
position in its endeavours to achieve an
appropriate balance between not over-
Northern Ireland: Does the System Comply With the
European Convention on Human Rights? (Northern
Ireland Human Rights Commission 2004) 13.
9 Oneryildiz v. Turkey, no. 48939/99, § 93, 30
November 2004. See also DJ Harris and others (n 1)
215.
10 See Osman v. the United Kingdom, no.
87/1997/871/1083, § 116, 28 October 1998.
11 ECHR, ‘Country Profile’
<http://www.echr.coe.int/Pages/home.aspx?p=pres
s/factsheets&c=> Accessed 7 July 2016.
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burdening its Member States and securing
the adequate protection of the right to life.
II. LEGAL MATERIALS AND
METHOD
The legal materials of this paper are
primary and secondary legal materials. It
uses the statute and conceptual approaches
as well as case study approaches. Journals
articles are employed by this paper to
sharpen the analysis. This paper heavily
lays on the European Convention on
Human Rights and several relevant
European cases to analyse legal problems
proposed.
The research is divided into three
parts, which include, firstly, the review of
the evolvement of the procedural
requirements of article 2 in cases of deaths
arising from the acts of state agents.
Secondly, it examines whether the
procedural requirements of article 2 can be
used as a mean in securing the adequate
protection of the right to life from arbitrary
killing by the use of lethal force and
thirdly, it analysis the effectiveness of legal
system as a procedural requirement of
12 Anguelova v. Bulgaria (n 5) § 137; Nachova and
Others v. Bulgaria (n 5); Leonidis v. Greece (n 1) §
68; Al-Skeni v. the United Kingdom (n 5).
13 See McCann and Others v. the United Kingdom
(n 1) § 161; Kaya v. Turkey (n 5); Ergi v. Turkey (n
5); Çakici v. Turkey (n 1), 8 July 1999; Tanrikulu v.
Turkey (n 5); McKerr v. the United Kingdom (n 1)
§ 111; Hugh Jordan v. the United Kingdom (n 1) §
105; Kelly and Others v. the United Kingdom (n 1)
article 2 in the case of homicide caused by
the negligence of the authorities.
III. RESULT AND DISCUSSION
A. The Alteration of Duty to Investigate
in Cases of Deaths Arising From the
Actions of State Agents
The Court imposes a duty to conduct
an official investigation in the cases of
deaths resulting from the actions of state
agents as a procedural requirement of
article 2. The fundamental purpose of
investigation is to figure out whether
domestic laws adequately protect the right
to life as well as to ensure the
accountability of the person in charge.12
When the life is taken by the use of force,
the requirements of article 2 paragraph 2 of
the ECHR must be satisfied. That is why an
effective investigation is needed in order to
review the lawfulness of the use of force.
This procedural obligation applies not only
to the case of homicides by the use of lethal
force,13 but also to other non-lethal force
cases where state agents potentially bear
responsibility for loss of life14 as well as
§ 94; Shanaghan v. the United Kingdom (n 1) § 88;
Anguelova v. Bulgaria (n 5); Ulku Ekinci v. Turkey
(n 5); Hackett v. the United Kingdom (n 5); Nachova
and Others v. Bulgaria (n 5) § 110; Ramsahai v. the
Netherlands (n 5); Al-Skeni v. the United Kingdom
(n 5).
14 E.g. Erikson v. Italy (n 8); Oneryildiz v. Turkey (n
9). See also D Korff (n 8); DJ Harris and others, (n
1) 215.
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killings by non-state actors.15 However, in
this writing the author will only focus on
examining the judgments of the Court
concerning cases of deaths arising from the
actions of state agents.
The Court first develops this
procedural obligation in the case of
McCann and Others v. the United
Kingdom after interpreting obligation to
protect the right to life under article 2 in
conjunction with state’s positive obligation
to secure rights and freedoms within its
jurisdiction under article 1.16 In its early
jurisprudence, the Court only asserts the
importance of effective investigation to
assess the lawfulness of the use of force by
state authorities without clarifying further
the meaning of effective investigation
itself. The Court asserts “it is not necessary
in the present case for the Court to decide
what form such an investigation should
take and under what conditions it should be
conducted”. According to J Chevalier-
Watts, in this case the Court seems to be
using a pragmatic approach. This mode
was influenced by the abstract nature of the
obligation to investigate as an implied
provision; therefore the Court tends to
apply a wider margin of appreciation to the
states. Nevertheless, the McCann Case is a
15 See Ulku Ekinci v. Turkey (n 5).
16 McCann and Others v. the United Kingdom (n 1)
§ 161.
17 ibid § 162.
cornerstone in assuring the accountability
of state agents and prevents the arbitrary
killings by the use of force.
Moreover, in the McCann Case the
Court implicitly begins to recognise the
importance of public scrutiny as an
important part of inquest procedure by
mentioning some forms of public inquest
proceedings, such as: the proceedings had
been public, the involvement of legal
representation of victims, and the hearing
of large number of witnesses (79 people).17
Therefore, in this case the Court concluded
that the official investigation was
sufficient. This finding was strongly
critised by the applicants. They claimed
that they were not equally represented in
the proceedings and not all eyewitnesses
were traced.18
In Kaya v. Turkey, the failure to
conduct an independent investigation of
the circumstances surrounding the killing
of the victim has been concluded as a
violation of procedural obligation of article
2.19 The case was about the killing of the
applicant’s brother, Mr Abdülmenaf Kaya,
in a gun battle between members of the
security forces and a group of terrorists. Mr
Abdülmenaf Kaya was alleged as one of
the assailants who died in the hostilities. In
18 ibid 163.
19 Kaya v. Turkey (n 5) § 92. See also Ergi v. Turkey
(n 5) § 85.
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this case, the prosecutor did not conduct an
effective investigation. Intentionally, he
ignored any obligation or need to carry out
an independent reconstruction of the
killing events. He just accepted any
information given by the military and did
not conduct any fingerprinting to verify
whether the weapon and ammunition truly
belonged to the deceased. Furthermore, the
prosecutor failed to investigate the validity
of the allegations against the victim: was he
a terrorist or just a farmer living near the
battle?20
In the above, the Court seems to
assess the elements of effective official
investigation on the basis of case by case.21
Although in previous judgments public
scrutiny and independence have become
important parts of any effective official
investigation that fulfills the procedural
limb of article 2, the detail requirements of
an effective official investigation itself are
still obscure.
On 4 May 2001 the Court decided
four cases from Northern Ireland, which
later became an essential case law
concerning the procedural requirement of
article 2 in cases of deaths resulting from
the actions of state agents. The judgments
20 ibid §§ 88-90.
21 See Ulku Ekinci v. Turkey (n 5).
22 McKerr v. the United Kingdom (n 1) §§ 112-5;
Hugh Jordan v. the United Kingdom (n 1) §§ 106-
9, 4 May 2001; Kelly and Others v. the United
of McKerr v. the United Kingdom, Hugh
Jordan v. the United Kingdom, Kelly and
Others v. the United Kingdom, and
Shanaghan v. the United Kingdom have
clarified four important tests in
determining the sufficiency of an adequate
and effective investigation into alleged
unlawful killing by state agents. These tests
are: the independence of investigators, the
effectiveness of the investigation, the
promptness and reasonable expedition, and
the element of public scrutiny.22 These four
elements are cumulative; a failure to satisfy
one of them may lead to a violation. The
use of these four tests has been consistently
reiterated by the Court in its recent
judgments, such as in the case of Ramsahai
v. the Netherlands and the case of Al-Skeni
v. the United Kingdom.23
Independence means no vertical or
institutional connection between the
investigators or prosecutors and the alleged
perpetrators. Once an incident of death
involving the use of lethal force is noticed,
an effective and adequate official
investigation must be conducted by the
authorities without waiting for any claim
from the deceased relatives. The
effectiveness of an investigation can be
seen from whether it can assess the legality
Kingdom (n 1) §§ 95-8; Shanaghan v. the United
Kingdom (n 1) §§ 89-92.
23 See Ramsahai v. the Netherlands (n 5); and Al-
Skeni v. the United Kingdom (n 5).
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of the use of force, identify and punish the
offenders, and that it takes reasonable
measures in securing evidence relating to
the incident.24 Any deficiency, such as the
lack of independence, the lack of
transparency, the failure to inspect the
responsible officials, the absence of legal
assistance for representing the victims’
family, the failure to disclose the witness
statements, and the delay in inquest
proceedings that has impeded the public
prosecutors from obtaining sufficient
evidence in order to warrant prosecution,
can be concluded as a violation of the
procedural limb of the right to life.25
Furthermore, the Court extends the
procedural requirement of article 2 to the
incidence of deaths caused by state agents
in non-lethal force cases.26 This extension
is applied to medical malpractice27 and
officials’ negligence,28 because in such
cases state institutions normally conceal
the truth in a collusive manner. Hence, the
investigation is addressed to ensure
demonstration of evidence regarding the
criminal liability of the offenders and the
transparency of the actions of state
officials. Uniquely, in these typical cases
24 McKerr v. the United Kingdom (n 1) §§ 111-3,
157; Hugh Jordan v. the United Kingdom (n 1) §§
109-6, 142; Kelly and Others v. the United Kingdom
(n 1) §§ 95-8, 136; Shanaghan v. the United
Kingdom (n 1) §§ 89-92, 122.
25 ibid. See also Leonidis v. Greece (n 1) § 68.
26 See Calvelli and Ciglio v. Italy, no. 32967/96, §
49, 17 January 2002; and Oneryildiz v. Turkey (n 9).
the Court declared that the procedural
obligation does not just stop at the
investigation process, but how to create an
effective judicial system for victims.29 If
the homicide was caused by an
unintentional error of judgment or
carelessness by the agents of the state, it
might only be fulfilled by civil,
administrative or other available
disciplinary sanctions. However, deaths
caused by a serious negligence of the
authorities can be considered as the breach
of the right to life in its procedural aspect,
if the state did not charge the offenders
with criminal offences.30
From the above explanations it can
be said that the Court, as an enforcement
organ of the ECHR, has tried to be more
protective of the right to life. Its innovation
in its jurisprudence, concerning a state’s
duty to investigate cases of deaths resulting
from the actions of state agents, has
become an important aspect in the
supremacy of the right to life. Although in
its early judgments the Court seems
reluctant to impose a burden on the states,
by not mentioning the detail requirements
of an effective investigation, the Court has
27 Erikson v. Italy (n 8). See also D Korff (n 8); J
Chevalier-Watts (n 8); and T McGleenan (n 8).
28 Oneryildiz v. Turkey (n 9). See also DJ Harris and
others (n 1) 215.
29 ibid § 95.
30 ibid § 93.
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come up with a progressive step in its
recent judgments by clarifying the scope
and content of an effective and adequate
official investigation. However, the issue
of whether imposing duty to investigate
will become an excessive burden to the
states, is still questioned. Therefore the
next section will discuss this issue further.
A. Examining the Court’s Position in
the Use of Force Cases
The Court’s progressivity in
protecting the right to life is obvious. A
failure to investigate homicide caused by
the actions of state agents potentially
results in a violation of article 2. There is
no time limit for the state to be bound by
this obligation. When new evidence is
found, the state has a responsibility to
respond promptly and conducts a further
investigation if needed.31 The Court puts
quite a high standard on the protection of
the right to life in the context of homicide
by the use of lethal force.
Duty to investigate has become an
important part of the right to life. The
substantive requirement of article 2, not to
use lethal force except in certain necessary
conditions, is different from the procedural
31 Brecknell v. the United Kingdom, no. 32457/04,
§§ 67-8, 27 November 2007.
32 D Korff (n 8) 35.
33 See McCann and Others v. the United Kingdom
(n 1).
requirement to hold an effective official
investigation into a death or deaths
resulting from the actions of state agents.32
There can be a violation of a substantive
requirement without a breach of procedural
limb.33 There can be also a breach of
procedural requirement only34 or a breach
of both types of requirements.35
Recalling the significant impact of
the Court’s judgments, in this chapter the
author will assess whether the requirement
has become an unreasonable and excessive
burden for the member states or not. Also,
whether the Court’s findings have
adequately protected the right to life. The
analyses will be based on four
requirements of an effective and adequate
official investigation that has been
developed by the Court in its judgments
which, as cited above, are the
independence of the investigators, the
effectiveness of the investigation, the
promptness and reasonable expedition, and
public scrutiny.
The independence of the investigators
The domestic laws of the states
should be able to support the independence
and impartiality of the persons responsible
34 Kaya v. Turkey (n 5). See also Ergi v. Turkey (n
5).
35 See Isayeva, and Others v. Russia (n 1).
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for conducting the investigation and
prosecution.36 Impartiality becomes a
compulsory part of an effective official
investigation. The lack of independence
may lead to a violation such as in Brecknell
v. the United Kingdom.37 Moreover, in
many cases, the lack of independence
frequently results in the devastation of the
fact-finding process. In a worst case
scenario, such as Anguelova v. Bulgaria,
where the deceased died in police custody,
the detention register was forged and the
autopsy record was modified in order to
blur the cause of the skull fracture.38
Hence, the Court found a violation of
article 2 due to the lack of impartiality of
the investigators that lead to the omission
of key evidence concerning the
incidence.39
The key element of independence is
the lack of hierarchical or institutional
connection between the alleged
perpetrators and the investigators.40 This
requirement may be hard to be satisfied by
the state. For example, if the death was
conducted by a police officer, because
sometimes the police are the only
36 Nachova and Others v. Bulgaria (n 1) § 112.
37 Brecknell v. the United Kingdom (n 31) p 27.
38 Anguelova v. Bulgaria (n 5) § 142.
39 ibid §§ 145-6.
40 McKerr v. the United Kingdom (n 1) § 111; Hugh
Jordan v. the United Kingdom (n 1) § 109; Kelly
and Others v. the United Kingdom (n 1) § 98;
Shanaghan v. the United Kingdom (n 1) § 92.
41 Hackett v. the United Kingdom (n 5).
responsible institution to carry out a
criminal investigation in a particular state.
However, this problem can be over-ridden
by inviting a foreign investigator from
another region such as in the case of
Hackett v. the United Kingdom.41
The effectiveness of the investigation
As described in a previous section,
the scope and content of an effective
investigation consists of three aspects: i)
whether it can examine the legality of the
use of force; ii) whether it can identify and
punish the offenders, and iii) whether the
investigation has been done reasonably in
order to secure the evidence in the field.
From these elements it seems the Court
places a high standard on the states if they
are going to satisfy the requirements.
However, the Court’s reiteration that duty
to investigate is an obligation of means, not
of result, tends to lessen the degree of
responsibility.42
There is not an absolute right of the
applicants to gain a prosecution or
conviction.43 As long as the state has
conducted an investigation diligently, it
42 See McKerr v. the United Kingdom (n 1) §§ 112-
3; Hugh Jordan v. the United Kingdom (n 1) §§ 106-
7, 4 May 2001; Kelly and Others v. the United
Kingdom (n 1) §§ 95-6; Shanaghan v. the United
Kingdom (n 1) §§ 89-90; Anguelova v. Bulgaria (n
5) § 139; Al-Skeni v. the United Kingdom (n 5) §
166.
43 Brecknell v. the United Kingdom (n 31) § 66.
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may fulfill the requirement of having
conducted an effective investigation. This
notion is confirmed by the judgment of
Szula v. the United Kingdom.44 In the case
of Szula the Court did not ask the state to
hold a new investigation, although the
police failed to gain sufficient evidence for
prosecution. As with Szula, in the case of
Giuliani and Gaggio v. Italy the applicants
also failed to secure their claims because
the state showed that it had conducted an
effective investigation. The effectiveness
was seen from the state’s ability to assess
the lawfulness of the use of force, as well
as the compatibility of the planning and
organisation of the killing policy with the
obligation to protect life. Although the
forensic doctors was failed to trace the
fragment of cartridge embedded in the head
of victim, the limitation of “obligation of
means” does not require the investigation
to be done to that extent.45 This is
understandable, as long as the forensic
examination was conducted transparently.
The promptness and reasonableness of
expedition
44 See Szula v. the United Kingdom, no. 18727/06,
4 January 2007.
45 Giuliani and Gaggio v. Italy [GC], no. 23458/02,
24 March 2011. See also S Skinner, ‘The Right to
Life, Democracy and State Responsibility in ‘Urban
Guerilla’ Conflict: The European Court of Human
Rights Grand Chamber Judgment in Giuliani
It is understandable that there may be
some obstacles that prevent the progress of
an investigation. However, a prompt
response by the authorities is essential in
maintaining the effectiveness of their law
enforcement system and ignoring the nasty
allegations of fraud or collusion by the
communities.46 In McKerr case, the delay
in the inquest amounted to a violation of
the procedural aspect of article 2. The
expedition was not conducted in a
reasonable manner, as can be seen from
two aspects. First, the frequent and lengthy
adjournments to the proceedings were
taken without a reasonable cause. Second,
the Secretary of State often used public
interest immunity to prevent some
enquiries or disclosure of important
documents.47
In the context of investigation, how
long is a delay that may be caused by any
obstacles in the investigation process,
before it can no longer be tolerated. This
question is of course hard to answer as,
among other considerations, it is uniquely
contextual.
Public scrutiny
Gaggio v Italy’ (2011) 11:3 Human Rights Law
Review 567, 571-3.
46 See Brecknell v. the United Kingdom (n 31) §§
65; and McKerr v. the United Kingdom (n 1) §§
142-55.
47 ibid §§ 142-55.
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There is no doubt that the
involvement of the relatives of the
deceased in the investigation process
designed to figure out the causes of the
deaths, is vital.48 Leaving the next-of-kin
without any information will torture them
mentally. Therefore, since the beginning of
the jurisprudence in the McCann case, the
Court has asserted the importance of the
participation of the families of the
deceased.49
Nevertheless, the problem is how far
the deceased’s families can be involved in
the inquest or investigation process? In the
case of McCann there was no violation of
procedural limb of article 2 because the
next-of-kin of the deceased were
sufficiently represented in the proceedings
by some experienced lawyers that were
able to examine and question the key
witnesses, including those who were
involved in the planning and conduct of
anti-terrorist operations, such as police
officers and military personnel.50 While, in
the case of McKerr, there was a violation
of the procedural aspect of article 2, since
the applicants’ representations were
hindered from actively participating in
questioning the witnesses, because they did
not have access to witness statements
before the appearance of the witness.
48 ibid § 147.
49 McCann and Others v. the United Kingdom (n 1).
Actually, in the case of McCann the
applicants also did not have any access to
the witness statements. However, as there
was a change in the procedure, under new
regulations (Home Office Circular No.
20/99) the Coroners were required to
provide copies of the written statements or
inquest documents to the interested parties,
such as the deceased’s families, when the
deaths were caused in custody or resulted
from the actions of police personnel.51 This
move was addressed to assure the
transparency of the investigation process.
From this comparison, it can be concluded
that the Court is following the national
laws in interpreting the requirement of
public scrutiny. In this case the focus is on
the relatives of the deceased gaining access
to relevant documents.
This approach is problematic
because, on the one hand the Court is trying
to protect the right to life, while not
imposing a strict burden on the member
states; but on the other hand, such action
may lead to a wider application of margin
of appreciation. It is feared that potentially
there will be an imbalance in the standards
of protection, particularly if the domestic
laws of the member states do not favour the
right to life.
50 McCann and Others v. the United Kingdom (n 1).
51 McKerr v. the United Kingdom (n 1) § 78.
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B. Duty to Investigate Non-Lethal
Force Cases: Challenges and
Opportunities
Initially the Court imposed an
obligation to investigate suspicious deaths
arising from the actions of state agents
through the use of lethal force. Then, the
Court extended this obligation to cases of
unexpected deaths arising from gross
negligence by public authorities, such as in
medical malpractice and life-threatening
environmental risk.52
Different with the deaths involving
the illegitimate use of force, in non-lethal
force cases the Court does not impose a
duty to investigate that leads, or would
lead, to a capability to prosecute the
responsible agents via criminal
proceedings.53 Criminal sanctions are
compulsory only when the deaths were
caused through gross negligence by the
authorities, where / when they failed to
prevent the foreseeable and imminent risk
of loss of life. This principle then makes it
complicated for the families of the victims
of medical malpractice to secure their
claim under the procedural limb of article
2, as discussed below.
52 See Erikson v. Italy (n 8); Sieminska v. Poland,
no. 37602/97, admissibility judgment of 29 March
2001; Oneryildiz v. Turkey (n 9); and Calvelli and
Ciglio v. Italy (n 26).
Medical malpractice
Although the Court has extended
the procedural requirement of article 2 to
deaths caused by state agents in non-lethal
force cases, practically it is not easy to
secure this claim before the Court. In the
case of hospital fatalities, the unintended
deaths do not always result in criminal
proceedings against the perpetrators,
because it is often hard to find a convincing
evidence to prosecute the alleged
perpetrators. Therefore, there should be an
effective judicial system that satisfies the
victims’ next-of-kin, such as a
compensation for damages, the publication
of the judgment, and the imposition of
disciplinary sanctions for those
responsible.54
In some hospital fatalities cases,
such as Erikson v. Italy, and Powell v. the
United Kingdom, the applicants failed to
secure their claims under procedural
requirement of article 2, due to the issue of
admissibility. In the case of Erikson v. Italy
the Court declared that the application is
inadmissible due to the lack of ability to
exhaust existing domestic remedies,
especially concerning the applicants’
failure to bring a civil action for negligence
against the hospital.55 Conversely, in the
53 ibid.
54 Calvelli and Ciglio v. Italy (n 26) § 51.
55 Erikson v. Italy (n 8)
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case of Powell v. the United Kingdom the
application was also declared inadmissible
due to the applicants’ acceptance of
compensation in a civil claim. Hence, the
applicants are no longer considered as
victims under article 34 of the
Convention.56 From those two judgments,
the Court’s position seems obscure,
especially regarding the legal standing of
the families of deceased medical
malpractice victims bringing a claim under
the procedural limb of article 2.
By citing its verdict in the case of
Powell v. the United Kingdom, the Court
reiterates that the victims in the case of
Calvelli and Ciglio v. Italy are no longer
victims because they have received
compensation as a result of civil
proceeding. As a response to the decision,
the judges Rozakis, Bonello and Straznicka
together wrote a dissenting opinion arguing
that in these typical cases so far the Court
only applies a minimum protection to the
right to life.57 They maintain that criminal
proceedings are the most suitable for the
case of unintentional death caused by
medical negligence, rather than civil
litigation.58 Commonly civil proceedings
are more suitable for dealing with private
56 Powell v. the United Kingdom, no. 45305/99,
admissibility judgment of 4 May 2000. See also
Calvelli and Ciglio v. Italy (n 26) § 55.
57 Partly Dissenting Opinion of Judge Rozakis
Joined by Judges Bonello and Strážnická in the case
of Calvelli and Ciglio v. Italy.
58 ibid.
or material matters. The fact that the
families of the deceased have accepted
compensation for damages does not, in
essence, elapse their victim status. At least,
this is what the Court has developed in its
case law so far that “the obligations of the
State under Article 2 cannot be satisfied
merely by awarding damages”.59
The author tends to agree with the
opinions of those three dissenting judges.
In future the Court should move forward to
reveal a more moral approach in deciding
the case of an unexpected death or deaths
arising from surgical falsifications.
Although it means that the Court will
impose a strict burden on its member states,
accepting the taking of life through the
negligence of medical practitioners is
unreasonable, particularly if the hospital is
owned by the state. The state has to set
regulations within the public health
institutions to provide effective deterrence
and preventing threats to the right to life.
Also practically, the criminal laws of some
of the Convention’s member states, such as
Turkey and Italy, have recognised the
prosecution of unintentional homicide
caused by negligence.60
59 McKerr v. the United Kingdom (n 1) § 121. See
also Kaya v. Turkey (n 5) § 105; Yaşa v. Turkey,
Reports 1998-VI, § 74, 2 September 1998.
60 See Cakici v. Turkey (n 1); Ergi v. Turkey (n 5);
Ulku Ekinci v. Turkey (n 5) § 111; Calvelli and
Ciglio v. Italy (n 26).
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Life-threatening environmental risks
Oneryildiz v. Turkey was the first
case before the Court dealing with the
incidence of negligence caused by the
authorities regarding a life-endangering
condition. In its verdict the Court asserts
two standards of punishment applicable in
this kind of case. First, if the deprivation of
life is not caused intentionally, the state has
an obligation to provide an effective
judicial system to compensate the victims.
It can be done by awarding a certain
amount of money in civil proceedings or
applying administrative as well as
disciplinary remedies.61Second, the state
has a positive obligation to prosecute the
responsible perpetrators in criminal
proceedings, if the authorities fail to take
any measures to avert the loss of life, and
where they have realised that the risks is
imminent and foreseeable.62 Therefore, it
can be said in this context the Court tries to
set a more stringent standard, by including
criminal sanctions in an incident of gross
negligence by a state’s authorities
61 Oneryildiz v. Turkey (n 9) § 92.
62 ibid § 94.
63 McCann and Others v. the United Kingdom (n 1)
§ 161.
IV. CONCLUSION AND SUGGESTION
Article 2 does not literally
guarantee the right to have an effective
investigation. Nevertheless, the Court in its
verdicts develops a procedural requirement
of the right to life to conduct an effective
investigation. Duty to investigate emerges
as a consequence, when article 2 it is read
together with positive obligation of states
under article 1.63 In the beginning the Court
only specifies the importance of duty to
conduct an effective official investigation
in the cases of deaths caused by the use of
lethal force. As many cases appear, then
the Court extended this procedural limb of
article 2 to the incidence of homicide
arising from negligence of authorities,
particularly in hospital fatalities and life-
endangering conduct. In both kinds of
cases, the Court has a distinct approach is
setting a minimum standard for the states
to adhere to.
The Court applies four tests in
examining whether the investigation of
homicide arising from the use of force is
affective and adequate or not.64 First, the
investigators and prosecutors should have
a certain degree of impartiality. This status
64 See McKerr v. the United Kingdom (n 1) §§
112-5; Hugh Jordan v. the United Kingdom (n 1)
§§ 106-9; Kelly and Others v. the United Kingdom
(n 1) §§ 95-8; Shanaghan v. the United Kingdom
(n 1) §§ 89-92.
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can, at least in part, be justified by the lack
of hierarchical or institutional connection
to the perpetrators. Second, an effective
investigation is one that leads to a
conclusion of the legality of the use of
force and to a capability to identify as well
as punish the offenders. Third, the state
should demonstrate a prompt and
reasonable expedition in initiating and then
carrying out its investigation. Any delay
that may cause the ineffectiveness of the
investigation can be concluded as a breach
of article 2. Fourth, the involvement of the
families of the deceased in the inquest
proceedings leads to a blur in the question
of how far the next-of-kin can be included.
From those four tests, the Court
seems apply a high standard of
investigation to protect the right to life and
impose a strict obligation on the state. If
one of the tests is ignored, a violation of
article 2 may occur. In this context, the
Court has an opportunity to develop its
jurisprudence in favour of the protection of
the right to life from arbitrary killings by
state agents. This is justified by the
provision of article 2 paragraph 2 that
prohibits the taking of life by the use of
force, except if absolutely necessary. There
is no time limit for the state to be bound by
this obligation. When new evidence is
65 Brecknell v. the United Kingdom (n 31).
66 Partly Dissenting Opinion of Judge Rozakis
Joined by Judges Bonello and Strážnická (n 57).
found, the state has a responsibility to
respond promptly and conduct a further
investigation if needed.65 However, since
the four tests are not an obligation of result,
states have a certain degree of discretion as
to their investigatory conduct. As long as
they can demonstrate their measures,
potentially there will be no violation of
article 2. From that jurisprudence we can
learn that the Court has tried to achieve a
balance between not over-burdening its
member states and protecting the right to
life from arbitrary killings by the agents of
those states.
Conversely, in the case of
unexpected homicide caused by
authorities’ negligence in hospital
fatalities, the Court seems reluctant to
impose a burden on its states’ parties and
applies a minimum protection to the right
to life.66 Without mentioning the detailed
requirements of an effective and adequate
investigation, such as in previous cases, the
Court in this case maintains that if the
victims have received compensation in
civil proceedings, they will lose their
victim status.67 This jurisprudence is
totally different with the case of homicide
by the use of force, where the Court stated
that the procedural limb of article 2 could
not be fulfilled by awarding damages in
67 Powell v. the United Kingdom (n 56). See also
Calvelli and Ciglio v. Italy (n 26) § 55.
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civil litigations.68 Therefore, in this case
the Court tends to maintain its speed in
producing robust judgments securing the
right to life. Letting the state apply a wide
range of margin of appreciation, and as
long as the state has provided a
compensation for its authorities’
negligence, there will be no violation of
article 2. From the author’s perspective the
court does this, because literally article 2
only prohibits intentional killings, not
unintentional ones.
Interestingly, in the case of the loss
of life, due to gross negligence of public
authorities, and where the risks are
foreseeable, the Court tends to set a
stringent standard of protection to the right
to life. When there is gross negligence by
the authorities, the Court requires that
criminal proceedings should be carried out
to prosecute the responsible authorities.69
This jurisprudence is interesting, because a
stringent burden on states has been
implemented, although in incidents where
the fatal use of force is not present.
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